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INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA) was the first extraterritorial law in the world that
defined corruption of foreign officials as a crime instead of a means to “grease the wheels.”
Cooperation with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
foreign countries made it possible to put that principle into practice. That changed and
continues to change the way businesses develop worldwide, framing acceptable and plausible
business practices.
Although all countries have their own legal traditions and cultures of doing business that
might not eagerly accept the new anti-corruption rules, American companies establish their
own standards consistent with the FCPA principles in the local environment. That allows
American businesses to affect the systems of foreign countries “from the bottom:” local
business partners have to accept and adhere to an anti-corruption framework that might be
completely new for them.
In turn, FCPA enforcement proves the effectiveness of compliance systems for both
companies that apply them and societies where violations take place. On one hand, compliance
programs help organizations to minimize the burden of sanctions; on the other hand, such
enforcements may uncover pivotal problems inherent to a specific society and may trigger
changes.
I. Era of the FCPA
As a response to the numerous US businesses that made millions on bribing foreign
officials, President Carter signed the FCPA in December 1977. 1 This federal law has
extraterritorial effect that is applied to a broad category of persons: both those who have

FCPA Enforcement Against U.S. and Non-U.S. Companies, Michael S. Diamant, Christopher W.H. Sullivan,
Jason H. Smith, Michigan Business and Entrepreneurial Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2019, 353-379p., p.356;
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Diamant-Sullivan-Smith-FCPA-EnforcementAgainst-U.S.-and-Non-U.S.-Companies-Michigan-Business-Entrepreneurial-Law-Review-Spring-2019.pdf.
1
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formal ties with the US, and those who participate in furtherance of illegal activity while in
the US. 2
The FCPA has two parts: antibribery provisions that are enforced by the Department of
Justice, and record keeping provisions that are enforced by the Securities Exchange
Commission.3 Antibribery provisions prohibit:
“the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving
of anything of value to . . . any foreign official for purposes of . . . influencing any
act or decision of the foreign official . . . securing any improper advantage; or . . .
inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof . . . in order to assist [the company] in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.” 4
The record keeping provisions are applicable to the companies that trade their securities
in the US and require such companies “to (a) make and keep books and records that
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions of the corporation and (b) devise and maintain an
adequate system of internal accounting controls.” 5 False records in the books do not have to
be linked to bribes to trigger enforcement of the FCPA’s bribery provisions. 6
II. Anti-Corruption Compliance in US Companies
1. Trend on Corporate Anti-Corruption Compliance Programs
The US companies and some non-US companies became the subject of the FCPA after its
enactment, but actual enforcement under this Act was not active: for the first two decades the
DOJ and SEC initiated approximately 3 cases a year. 7 After the Enron case, the government

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview (January 2010);
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2010/01/the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-an-overview.
3
Can Global Organizations use Values-Based Leadership to Combat Briberies and Corruption? Joseph J.
Lestrange, Yulia Tolstikov-Mast, Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics vol. 10(4) 2013, 41-56p., p.
43; http://www.na-businesspress.com/JLAE/Tolstikov-MastY_Web10_4_.pdf.
4
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
5
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.
6
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
7
FCPA Enforcement Against U.S. and Non-U.S. Companies, Michael S. Diamant, Christopher W.H. Sullivan,
Jason H. Smith, Michigan Business and Entrepreneurial Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2019, 353-379p., p.357;
2
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seemed to pay close attention to companies’ accounting and management procedures, as well
as to cross-border transactions as the result of the US PATRIOT Act enactment 8 in 2001.

https://www.gibsondunn.com/2018-year-end-fcpa-update/

It was long thought that the FCPA hinders business of US companies abroad in
comparison with other companies that actively use bribery as a means of obtaining contracts
and foreign markets. However, it was discovered that anti-corruption compliance is beneficial
for companies. Most companies were willing to improve their corporate governance where it
influenced external reputation. Companies that had robust anti-corruption systems
experienced about 50% less corruption violations than companies without such systems and
the business performance of the companies with anti-corruption compliance was more
successful in comparison with the peers who used bribes. 9
Now, under the pressure of the FCPA, the Anti-Bribery Conventions of the OECD and
United Nations Organizations (UNO), the UK Bribery Act, and other anti-corruption

https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Diamant-Sullivan-Smith-FCPA-EnforcementAgainst-U.S.-and-Non-U.S.-Companies-Michigan-Business-Entrepreneurial-Law-Review-Spring-2019.pdf.
8
Can Global Organizations use Values-Based Leadership to Combat Briberies and Corruption? Joseph J.
Lestrange, Yulia Tolstikov-Mast, Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics vol. 10(4) 2013, 41-56p., p.
43; http://www.na-businesspress.com/JLAE/Tolstikov-MastY_Web10_4_.pdf.
Can Global Organizations use Values-Based Leadership to Combat Briberies and Corruption? Joseph J.
Lestrange, Yulia Tolstikov-Mast, Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics vol. 10(4) 2013, 41-56 p., p.
46; http://www.na-businesspress.com/JLAE/Tolstikov-MastY_Web10_4_.pdf.
9
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legislation, combatting bribery and establishing anti-corruption systems in organizations
became a trend. 10 The OECD research found that the decision to establish compliance
systems inside a company was in most cases affected by one of these reasons: (1)
governmental requirement (26 out of 124 respondents – 21%), (2) the company board’s
requirement to elaborate the anti-corruption program (37 respondents – 29.8%, or (3) the
company’s executive management decision to establish the anti-corruption program (41
respondent – 33.1%). However, external and internal incentives might work together when a
governmental authority requires a compliance program, and the board or management
decides to do the same. 11
Also, respondents were asked about the motivation to develop an anti-corruption
program: for 35 respondents out of 60 (58.3%), reputation was the top priority; for 19
respondents out of 60 (31.7%), avoidance of prosecution or other legal actions was the top
priority. 12 Among other motives that were not measured were: to improve an organization’s
culture; to bid for customers and investors and require them to keep up with the company’s
established standards; to adhere to changes in home country legislation; and, to keep up with
changes in the company’s business activities. 13 As we can see, companies caught the trend of
compliance programs that was started by governments and realized how take advantage of it.
2. Anti-Corruption Compliance Programs in the US
As to the US, anti-corruption compliance programs are not obligatory for companies
(except maybe some specific industries like banking), although they may help to mitigate or

Can Global Organizations use Values-Based Leadership to Combat Briberies and Corruption? Joseph J.
Lestrange, Yulia Tolstikov-Mast, Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics vol. 10(4) 2013, 41-56p., p.
43; http://www.na-businesspress.com/JLAE/Tolstikov-MastY_Web10_4_.pdf.
11
OECD (2020), Corporate Anti-Corruption Compliance Drivers, Mechanisms, and Ideas for Change, 90 p.,
p.14-16; https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Corporate-anti-corruption-compliance-drivers-mechanisms-andideas-for-change.pdf.
12
Id., p.18.
13
Id., p. 21-26.
10
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even avoid criminal prosecution. 14 Before the DOJ enacted a consolidated manual on
evaluation of corporate compliance programs in 2019 15, guidance existed in the form of the
US Sentencing Guidelines, the DOJ manual “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations,” which instructed prosecutors to consider “the adequacy and effectiveness of
the corporation’s compliance program at the time of the offense, as well as at the time of a
charging decision,” 16 and the corporation’s remedial efforts “to implement an adequate and
effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one.” 17 So, in the US, there
was a long history of company investigations that took into account corporate compliance
programs.
These documents are the framework for both investigators and companies for factors
emphasized during an investigation and what to anticipate during a prosecution. 18 Section
8B2.1 of the US Sentencing Guidelines define seven main elements of an effective
compliance program: 1) standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct; 2)
leaders’ governance and oversight over the compliance program to ensure its effectiveness
and adequacy of support, and that specific people are empowered to implement the program;
3) no people at leadership positions engaged in illicit activities; 4) trainings and other ways of
disseminating information about compliance and ethics programs; 5) monitoring, auditing,
and evaluation of the program and establishing an anonymous reporting system; 6)
appropriate incentives for complying with the ethics program, and discipline measures for
engaging in criminal conduct and failing to prevent the violation; and, 7) response and

Anti-Corruption in the United States by John Meyer, William Devaney, and Peter Tomczak, part 5;
https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-in-the-united-states/.
15
DOJ Updates Guidance on the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs by Aisling O’Shea, Nicolas
Bourtin, and Anthony Lewis, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (June 20, 2020);
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/20/doj-updates-guidance-on-the-evaluation-of-corporate-complianceprograms/#4b.
16
JM § 9-28.300.
17
Id.
18
Anti-Corruption in the United States by John Meyer, William Devaney, and Peter Tomczak, part 5;
https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-in-the-united-states/
14
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prevention of further similar conduct. 19 In the meantime, before establishing the compliance
program, a company should provide a thorough risk assessment and define the areas of high
risk. This “can [help to] escape the fate of painful compliance reviews and instead become a
critical scale by which to assess and address potential pitfalls before they come to damaging
fruition.” 20
In 2019, the DOJ’s Criminal Division created a general manual entitled “Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Program” that embraced all the guidance of other departments: the
DOJ’s Fraud Section guidance as of February 2017, the DOJ’s FCPA Corporate Enforcement
Policy for all Criminal Division cases as of March 2018, and the DOJ’s Criminal Division
policy ‘concerning the selection and appointment of corporate compliance monitors’ 21 as of
October 2018. 22 This manual created a single standard for investigation of all criminal cases
with companies and provided additional guidance in multifactor evaluation of compliance
programs of organizations. In this manual, the DOJ challenges investigated companies to
answer three questions: “1) is the program well designed? 2) Is the program effectively
implemented? 3) Does the compliance program actually work in practice?” 23
Meanwhile, companies with corporate compliance programs (including anti-corruption)
often fail in their anti-corruption efforts. Among the reasons of such failures are: 1) no
adherence to the compliance by the senior management (if leaders do not take compliance
seriously, nobody will do that in the organization); 2) ineffective use of technology (if

https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/§8B2.1.
Building an effective compliance risk assessment programme for a financial institution, Stephanie Nicolas*
and Paul V. May, Journal of Securities Operations & Custody Volume 9 Number 3 (January 20, 2017), 215-224
p., p.216;
https://www.henrystewartpublications.com/sites/default/files/Nicolas%2C%20Stephanie%20%26%20May%2C
%20Paul%20JSOC%209-3.pdf.
21
DOJ Updates Guidance on the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs by Aisling O’Shea, Nicolas
Bourtin, and Anthony Lewis, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (June 20, 2020);
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/20/doj-updates-guidance-on-the-evaluation-of-corporate-complianceprograms/#4b.
22
Id.
23
U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Program”;
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download.
19

20
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information is collected inaccurately, understanding of how the business is working is lost,
which that leads to incorrect judgments on how to respond to the risks); 3) inadequate
response to complaints and inadequate informational plumbing (an organization has to make
sure that the employer received response on his report about misconduct); and, 4) failure to
notice an employee’s misconduct (one needs to engage with employees before the
misconduct happens, communicate the compliance program, make sure that people
understand it). 24 So, despite the existence of guidance, manuals, and cases, there are
companies that face problems with their compliance systems that lead to investigations and
loss of money and reputation. In the following cases we will see some of the abovementioned
failures.
III. Case Studies
1. Alfred C. Toepfer International Ukraine Ltd. (a subsidiary of a US Archer
Daniels Midland Company)
a) The Scheme in Ukraine
In 2013, Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), a food processing and commodities
trading company, 25 entered into a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with the Department of
Justice (DOJ). It paid $36.6 million for failing to establish effective internal accounting
controls, which resulted in illegal payments by the subsidiaries in Ukraine and Venezuela. 26
Also that year, Alfred C. Toepfer International Ukraine Ltd. (ACTI Ukraine), an ADM
indirect 80% subsidiary, 27 “pleaded guilty in the Central District of Illinois to one count of
conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and agreed to pay $17.8 million

Corporate Compliance Programs: Everything You Need to Know, Matt Kelly (August 11, 2020);
https://www.ganintegrity.com/blog/corporate-compliance-program/#top.
25
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADM_(company).
26
ADM Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, December 20,
2013. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/adm-subsidiary-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-violate-foreign-corruptpractices-act.
27
Attachment A, Statement of Facts, p. A-1. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2014/01/03/adm-npa.pdf.
24
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in criminal fines.” 28 In sum, ADM and its subsidiary paid around $54 million. All these
prosecutions and fines resulted partially from bribing Ukrainian officials through
intermediaries with the aim to obtain a value added tax (VAT) refund. 29
The FCPA violation was triggered by the inability of ACTI Ukraine to obtain the VAT
refund to which it was entitled from the state without making facilitation payments. Such a
situation is not surprising as the Office of the US Trade Representative reported that “the
[Ukraine State Tax Administration] instituted an automated system for VAT refunds, but
non-transparent criteria have prevented most firms from participating in the system and
receiving their refunds.” 30 Although obtaining the money was legal, the act was considered as
illegal because the company obtained the refund “earlier than they otherwise would have” as
the SEC noted. 31
To speed up the process of the VAT refund, the management of ACTI Ukraine and Alfred
C. Toepfer International G.m.b.H. (ACTI Hamburg), another ADM subsidiary, decided to
provide “donations” to the Ukrainian governmental officials who facilitated the VAT
refunds. 32 Although the payments were named “donations,” in fact they were paid to the
officials through fake agreements with Vendor 1 and 2. 33 To transfer funds to the Ukrainian
governmental officials, two schemes were performed:
(1) From 2002 to 2008, ACTI Ukraine and ACTI Hamburg employed U.K. Vendor 1.
They paid specific price to Vendor 1 for commodities. “Vendor 1 then sold those
commodities to ACTI Hamburg for a higher price, which included the amount Vendor 1 paid

ADM Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, December 20, 2013.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/adm-subsidiary-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-violate-foreign-corrupt-practices-act
29
Although ADM subsidiaries also violated FCPA in Venezuela, for the purpose of this paper that will not be
considered.
30
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Ukraine.pdf.
31
Supermarket to the World – the ADM FCPA Enforcement Action,
https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/supermarket-to-the-world-the-adm-fcpa-enforcement-action/.
32
Attachment A, Statement of Facts. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2014/01/03/adm-npa.pdf.
33
Id. at A-8.
28
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for the commodities, shipping costs, the amount of the bribe, and a handling fee. The amount
paid to Vendor 1 in connection with the bribe generally equaled eighteen (18) percent of the
VAT refund obtained” 34; and,
(2) From 2007 to 2008, ACTI Ukraine purchased unnecessary insurance policies for its
commodities from Ukrainian Vendor 2 in the amount that covered the price for the bribe.
Insurance purchases took place right the day before or after the VAT refund. 35
The questions regarding suspicious donations were raised by ADM management through
2002-2007:
(1) in 2002, after meeting with ACTI Hamburg executives, the ADM management raised
the questions: (a) whether donations to the Ukrainian governmental officials were illegal, (b)
why the donations were not deductible, (c) whether such payments might be against the
ADM compliance policy, (d) whether these donations are Subpart F income, 36 and (e) that the
payments might not be booked in accordance with US GAAP; 37
(2) in 2004, ADM employed an accounting firm to check tax risks regarding creating a
joint venture between ADM and a Swiss company in Ukraine. This firm reported that the
schemes of VAT optimization that are applicable in Ukraine might pose tax and legal risks; 38
(3) in 2006-2007, ADM’s accounting firm found a “reserve” in ACTI Ukraine’s books
that equaled to 20% of the VAT refund that was expected. ACTI Hamburg explained that the
company is supposed to compensate the officials for the refund. 39

Attachment A, Statement of Facts, p. A-3. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2014/01/03/adm-npa.pdf.
35
Id. at A-2.
36
“… Subpart F income include [among other things] … illegal bribes and kickbacks”
(https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2021/feb/gilti-subpart-f-distributions-appreciated-property.html).
37
Attachment A, Statement of Facts, p. A-5. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2014/01/03/adm-npa.pdf.
38
Id. at A-6.
39
Id. at A-6, A-7.
34

11

Throughout the period 2002-2008, ADM’s management was reluctant to analyze the real
nature of the payments to the Ukrainian officials. In early 2009, 40 the company disclosed
information about its FCPA violations. After investigation, ADM was accused of the failure
to build an anti-corruption compliance system, analyze transactions with vendors, and track
down corrupt payments. 41
b) NPA Requirements
As the result of entering into the NPA, ADM made a commitment to strengthen its anticorruption compliance and periodically report to the DOJ “regarding remediation and
implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies, and procedures.” 42
The DOJ gave general guidance of what it would expect to see in ADM’s reports, although
the company was free to adjust the requirements to enhance its compliance according to own
needs and vision. The DOJ’s general requirements included: (1) leadership commitment to
the compliance; (2) a written anti-corruption system that would encourage ethical conduct
and build effective financial procedures, (3) providing an annual risk-based assessment of the
program that would concentrate on potential foreign bribery issues, (4) assigning a
compliance officer or a team that would have enough autonomy to effectively execute its
obligations and have a direct access to the board/board committee, (5) periodic training of all
employees, including directors, and where appropriate business partners, and guidance in
anti-corruption legislation, including of foreign law, for employees and business partners; (6)
establishing a confidential (where possible) reporting system and investigation process; (7)
establishing working incentivizing and disciplining procedures; (8) risk-based due diligence
of business partners, including the necessity to insert certain terms in the contracts depending

ADM holds settlement reserve at $54 million, November 8, 2013, https://fcpablog.com/2013/11/08/admholds-settlement-reserve-at-54-million/.
41
Attachment A, Statement of Facts, p. A-8. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2014/01/03/adm-npa.pdf.
42
Id. at 3.
40

12

on the circumstances; (9) providing due diligence when acquiring new businesses, including
anti-corruption and FCPA due diligence and establishing anti-corruption policies in new
companies; and, (10) monitoring and testing of anti-corruption system and improving it. 43
According to the NPA, decisions regarding unlawful payments to Ukrainian
governmental officials were taken into consideration by ACTI Ukraine together with ACTI
Hamburg. According to German law, facilitation payments (“payments of small amounts to
public officials in order to induce them to perform their duties in a faster way”) 44 are
forbidden to governmental officials both in Germany and the European Union (the EU) 45.
Nevertheless, German law allows such payments outside the EU “as long as they are not
made in order to obtain a future official act by which the foreign public official is violating
his or her duties” 46 (although, it is hard to consider the payments made in ACTI Ukraine case
were “of small amounts”). Such a vague wording in the German legislation might be
interpreted as if Germany is lenient to bribes paid to non-EU officials that might be used in
an unlawful way. In ACTI Ukraine, this gap in the legislation might have triggered ACTI
Hamburg to play an active role in facilitating the bribery scheme.
c) Judicial Issues Regarding the Case
The ADM case brought questions among legal professionals regarding legality and
expedience of the prosecution under FCPA. It is hard to trace all the necessary elements of
FCPA crime in the ADM case: (1) corrupt intent (“evil motive or purpose”) 47; (2) intent to
obtain or retain business (“the linkage to obtain or retain specific or even general business” in
the ADM action seems “so tenuous as to be nonexistent”) 48; and, (3) facilitating payments

Id. at B-1 – B-8.
Bribery and Corruption Laws & Regulations 2022| Germany, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practiceareas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/germany
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Why You Should Be Alarmed By the ADM FCPA Enforcement Action, p.2, Mike Koehler, 2014,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383938
48
https://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/FCPA/2014/FCPADigestTPFCPA010614.pdf
43
44
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(DOJ “must bear the burden of negating the facilitating payments exception” 49; “It is …
difficult to see how the DOJ would have satisfied this pleading burden given that the DOJ
itself alleged that VAT refunds were “owed” to ADM entities” 50). All of these reasons
resulted in uncertainty in the legality of the whole procedure.
Meanwhile, the reason why ADM eagerly made the deal with DOJ might be because it
was cheaper for ADM to agree on the proposed solution rather than spend huge amounts of
money and time on litigation and be under the threat of harsher criminal punishment. Also, if
the SEC found out about the doubtful transactions in the company’s books, ADM would have
reputational risk and further negative legal implications with a higher penalty. That is why it
was wiser for ADM to choose a “lesser evil” and self-report about the FCPA violation.
An FCPA violation is a serious transnational case that might affect Ukraine’s reputation
as a favorable country for investment. In this regard, it is logical that this violation
could/should attract the attention of Ukrainian government and law enforcement bodies,
because bribery was (and still is) illegal in Ukraine. 51 But, thorough research has not revealed
any information on prosecution of governmental officials involved in the corruption scheme.
It most probably means that nobody was prosecuted.
d) Compliance System Enhancement After the FCPA Violation
In his letter to the SEC in 2015 regarding FCPA violations committed by ADM, the
company’s outside legal counsel mentioned steps that were undertaken in complianceenhancing process: 1) employees who were involved in illegal scheme of ACTI Ukraine and
ACTI Hamburg were fired or left the company; 2) ADM expanded the number of compliance
personnel, including officers assigned for full support of anti-corruption efforts; 3) ADM

SEC v. Jackson, 908 F. Supp.2d 834 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/supermarket-to-the-world-the-adm-fcpa-enforcement-action/
50
Why You Should Be Alarmed By the ADM FCPA Enforcement Action, p.3, Mike Koehler, 2014,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383938
51
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2341-14/ed20130518#Text
49

50
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increased oversight and control over global operations to prevent the reoccurrence of the
FCPA violations; 4) ADM strengthened its control over third-party engagement that included
robust due diligent requirements, anti-corruption provisions in the contracts, and anticorruption trainings; and 5) the company intensified its payment controls. 52
Following the FCPA investigation, ADM hired Ben Bard, a new Chief Compliance
Officer (CCO) in 2014. Among his responsibilities was the overseeing of global compliance
policies and programs, including anti-corruption policies. In 2018, Ben Bard, being the
company’s CCO, was named to Compliance Week’s Top Minds 2018 as the best and
brightest in governance and compliance profession. ADM Senior Vice President, General
Counsel and Secretary Cameron Findlay mentioned that Bard rebuilt and created a highprofile agile compliance system in the company. 53 In 2020, ADM obtained recognition of
“Ethisphere, a global leader in defining and advancing the standards of ethical business
practices, as one of the 2020 World’s Most Ethical Companies.” 54

2. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (Teva) is an Israeli company. At the time of its
FCPA violation, it was the biggest manufacturer of generic drugs in the world. 55 In December
2016, Teva entered into Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with DOJ “in connection
with a criminal information … charging the company with one count of conspiracy to violate
the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and one count of failing to implement adequate
internal controls.” 56 The company paid a criminal penalty in the amount of $283,177,348,

https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2015/archer-daniels-midland-060315-405.pdf
https://www.adm.com/news/news-releases/adm-chief-compliance-officer-ben-bard-named-to-complianceweek-top-minds-2018
54
https://www.adm.com/news/news-releases/adm-named-one-of-2020-worlds-most-ethical-companies-byethisphere
55
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teva_Pharmaceuticals
56
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-million-resolveforeign-corrupt
52
53
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agreed to strengthen its compliance system and internal controls, and hire an external
compliance monitor for a 3 year period. Also, Teva paid $236 million in disgorgement to
SEC. 57 In total, the company paid around $520 million. As to Teva LLC (Teva Russia), a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Teva, 58 the company pleaded guilty “in one-count criminal
information … charging the company with conspiring to violate the anti-bribery provisions of
the FCPA.” 59
In this case, Teva and its subsidiaries were engaged in illicit payments to Russian,
Ukrainian, and Mexican authorities with the aim to spread its sclerosis drug Copaxone. 60
Also, Teva willfully failed to implement a robust anti-corruption system and accounting
controls at its subsidiaries, which promoted corruption acts. 61
a) The Scheme in Russia
Around 2007, Russian Ministry of Health announced seven diseases that are rare and
expensive to treat. As the healthcare system in Russia provided universal healthcare to its
citizens, the Ministry aimed to buy the needed treatment and supply it to patients for free. For
that reason, the Ministry provided auctions among suppliers of the required treatment.
Among the illnesses was multiple sclerosis, which was treated by Copaxone.
At that time, Teva and Teva Russia were on the lookout for the opportunity to increase
sales of Copaxone to the Russian government. In October 2006, Teva Russia Executive
informed Teva Executive that they found a Russian official who had influence on
governmental procurement of medicine in Russia, had contacts in Knesset, and was an owner
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(technically, the owner was his wife) of several wholesale pharmaceutical companies
(Russian company). Teva endorsed further cooperation with this Russian Official.
Even though the transparency of the Russian company was considered low, the Russian
company executive was under investigation for corruption, and Teva’s insurance company
refused to insure transactions with the Russian company, the Teva executive and Teva Russia
executive decided to go further and let the Russian company distribute Copaxone in Russia.
In 2009, the Russian government decided to give preference to domestic medicine at auction;
in mid-2010 the Russian company started repackaging of Teva’s Copaxone so that it fell
within the governmental domestic preference. When entering into the agreement with the
Russian company, Teva Russia’s Legal Director urged Teva to approve the deal, saying that
the owner of the business was the Official’s wife and that the Russian official did not have
any control over the business, hiding some facts about the Russian company executive’s
corruption investigation, and reports from the news media about Russian Official’s possible
involvement in corruption schemes in governmental medicine procurement in the past.
Despite all the red flags, the regional compliance officer approved the deal. During the time
of cooperation, the Russian official successfully lobbied Copaxone in Russian governmental
tenders. 62
Teva terminated cooperation with the Russian company in mid-2013 due to latter’s
refusal to comply with Teva’s due diligence procedures. During the term of corrupt
cooperation, the Russian Official received through his companies $204,167,303.
b) The Scheme in Ukraine
In Ukraine, all medicine was (and still is) allowed to market and sale only after state
testing and registration. For the period from 2001 to 2011, the Ukrainian Official who was

62
United States of America v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, p.A-6 –
A-16, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/920436/download

17

able to influence registration decisions in the government was “employed” by Teva, and then
Teva Ukraine, as a registration consultant under an annually-renewed consultancy agreement.
According to the agreement, the Ukrainian Official received a “consultancy fee.” In
addition to the fees, the company provided bonuses in cash, travel expenses, and items of
value. All these were done to incentivize the Ukrainian Official to improperly use his official
post and influence the medicine registration, including registration of Copaxone, in the
country. All the payments were knowingly approved by Teva. For the period from 2002 to
2011 Teva and Teva Ukraine paid approximately $200,000 to the Ukrainian Official. 63
c) Actors Behind the Schemes
Unfortunately, the DPA did not disclose names of the officials who participated in the
illegal schemes. Consequently, there is no available information regarding the corruption
investigation in Ukraine. Nevertheless, some fruitful journalistic investigations regarding
Teva corruption violations took place in Russia.
Although the name of the governmental official has not been disclosed, journalists found
that it was likely to be Boris Shpigel, who was a senator in the Council of the Russian
Federation (during 2003-2013) and simultaneously a shareholder of “Biotek” company. In
2008, this company obtained the exclusive right to packaging and distributing to the
government Teva’s Copaxone. The author of the article claims that Boris Shpigel was
personally acquainted with ex-President of Israel Shymon Peres and ex-Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, and that Teva was in Israel as widespread as Apple is in the US. That is
why it looked logical that Teva built connections with Mr. Shpigel. 64
In 2013, Teva unexpectedly unilaterally terminated the agreement with Biotek right
before the auction. According to the official version, the reason for such termination was that
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a new Teva CEO, Jeremy Levin, took active steps toward rebuilding the company’s business
practices towards European standards, instead of sometimes openly-corrupted operations. In
the meantime, according to another version, this termination related to the DOJ investigation
that had been going on for the past year. For Teva, it was better to pay penalties to Biotek due
to unilateral termination of the contract rather than to continue business.
After finding in the media information regarding Teva’s corruption violations in Russia,
the Minister of Health referred to the General Prosecutor a request to check the information
through international cooperation. 65 Nevertheless, there was no investigation initiated against
Mr. Shpigel in Russia. Interestingly, Boris Shpigel was accused of corruption in 2021, but not
in the Teva case. 66
d) DPA Requirements
According to the DPA, Teva had to strengthen its anti-corruption system. Although the
company declared to uphold the highest ethical standards by having an anti-corruption policy,
a reporting system (and even received reports), regular trainings for employees, an Audit
Committee, a Compliance Committee, internal risk managers and monitors, and regional
compliance officers according to its Corporate Social Responsibility Report within 20122015, 67 the DOJ provided Teva with general requirements similar to the ADM case regarding
an anti-corruption compliance system. Those requirements included, among other things,
high-level commitment of senior management to compliance, developing and promulgating
policies that would prohibit FCPA violations, creating a system of internal and accounting
procedures, internal reporting, and investigation and enforcement, and periodic risk-based
review. The DOJ’s actions prove that the company did not follow its own compliance
policies before the investigation.
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Further, Teva had to hire an independent monitor for three years. The main role of an
external monitor is to monitor a company’s conformity with the DPA, assess the compliance
system that the company implements, and mitigate the risk of recurrence of the misconduct.
Teva provided the monitor with access to any documents, facilities, employees, or vendors.
The monitor had to, among other things, periodically make plans regarding the company’s
further effective development, initial and follow-up reviews, and report on potential or actual
misconduct. 68
Teva also had to remove fifteen employees that were engaged in corruption matters;
establish a global compliance group that audited internal transactions; and strengthen its due
diligence function, including third party due diligence. 69
e) Compliance System Enhancement After the FCPA Violation
In its 2020 Environmental, Social and Governance Report (the Report), Teva declared
that over the last six years it had strengthened its compliance policy in its companies around
the globe. Considering dates, the company started the process of rebuilding its global
compliance system with the new CEO Jeremy Levin, after the FCPA violation occurred and
before self-reporting to the US officials. More than a year before settlement, the company
hired Lori Queisser, who had 30 years’ experience in compliance in pharmaceuticals
industry, as senior vice president and global chief compliance officer with to tackle
compliance issues. 70
In the Report, Teva announced first that: the CCO reports directly to the CEO and that the
Board’s Compliance Committee oversees and reviews policies and practices. Teva’s Global
Compliance and Ethics Department makes sure that the company is the relevant partner for
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other businesses on all levels of work. Second, it stated that an essential part of the
Company’s Code of Conduct is the Policy on the Prevention of Corruption, which establishes
minimum standards for corruption prevention, including internal controls of books and
records. This is the policy that fulfills the DOJ’s requirement regarding the anti-corruption
program). 71 Third, the Report details extensive risk-based global corruption trainings for
personnel that are held periodically and include Code of Conduct Training. Fourth, the
company described providing separate compliance trainings for board members that foster a
compliance culture inside the whole organization. Fifth, the company established an effective
compliance system that detects potential risk in daily operations, tracks and reports payments
to the members of healthcare community, and ensures integrity of books and records. Finally,
Teva established an Office of Business Integrity to investigate misconduct allegations and
address the issues with the company, and eventually strengthen its compliance policy. 72
It worth mentioning that an immense amount of work has been provided behind
reconstructions mentioned in the Report. After entering into the DPA with the DOJ, the
company seriously aimed to “build the best and most respected global compliance program in
the industry — a program that works in partnership with the business to prevent issues.” 73
Nevertheless, changes brought substantial expenses ($3bln) and put additional legal
burden on the approval process of vendors and customers. In these circumstances, the
company could manually process only around 2,000 requests to use third parties instead of
actual 500,000 requests. 74 Meanwhile, this process cost millions of dollars and did not help to
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reduce the risks. At the time, Lori Queisser stated that it was the biggest gap in the
compliance system, and they needed to do something. 75
With the help of an external consultant, Teva created and implemented a pre-screening
data analytics tool that automatically assigns a risk level to the third party. This tool contains
about 25 million records and can access information from open public databases to
effectively screen vendors and customers. Instead of waiting days and even months for
approval, the process takes several hours for most operations. That allows Teva to
concentrate on higher risk operations that are more efficient in terms of compliance. 76 The
company is continuing exploring new ways to employ artificial intelligence to enhance thirdparty diligence as it is a substantial burden and the hardest part of compliance with FCPA. 77
3. Lessons Drawn from the Cases
In the Teva and ADM cases we can see general features inherent in almost all companies
involved in FCPA investigations. To begin with, a parent company experienced hardships in
exercising control over its subsidiaries abroad. 78 ADM did not diligently consider issues
connected to the business in Ukraine, although the red flags were in place: reports from
accounting firms and ACTI Ukraine’s books. In Teva, management authorized most of the
illegal actions, although Teva Russia’s CEO and company’s lawyer hid some information
from the Teva management. Next, accounting provisions of the FCPA hold parent companies
liable for their subsidiaries’ illicit payments 79 Both Teva Pharmaceutical and ADM were
sanctioned for failing to establish robust accounting control inside their whole business
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structures. Next, the companies obtained substantial benefits from the bribes. 80 Teva
Pharmaceutical became the sole Copaxon supplier for the Russian government, obtained
quick formal registration of the medicine in Ukraine, and sold its medicine through bribed
doctors in Mexico; ACTI Ukraine obtained the VAT refunds through illegal facilitation
payments. Further, the bribery cost was relatively small in comparison with expected illegal
gains. 81 For example, in Russia, Teva earned $200 million and spent on bribes $65 million; 82
in ADM, subsidiaries paid around $22 million for bribes and received $100 million for the
VAT refund. 83 Next, privileged foreign officials used their offices for personal gains. 84 In
both cases officials’ ability to make decisions in the name of their governments opened
lucrative financial opportunities for them. Finally, top management was involved in largescale corruption issues. 85 In Teva, the parent company authorized the corruption scheme; in
ADM, subsidiaries management provided all the transactions, and parent company
management was reluctant to police such actions.
Further, in both the Teva and ADM cases, there were no corruption investigations against
the bribed officials in their countries. Although the media covered the FCPA investigations
against the companies, they stayed silent as to the identities of the governmental officials.
There was a journalistic investigation in Russia regarding Teva case that revealed the hidden
scheme of corrupt cooperation, but official media did not raise the issue among the society
and officials kept the things quiet.
Such a situation is not surprising considering corruption practices in these countries. The
reason for such an attitude is grounded in the weak tone at the top of the country that led to
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the lack of resources to prosecute the cases, illegal connections with the officials from law
enforcement bodies, bribes from law enforcement bodies, and maybe even fear to prosecute a
high-ranked official, which could have negative repercussions for a prosecutor.
IV. Analysis of the Impact on the Society
1. General Corruption Situation in the Eastern Europe Region
It is considered that the Eastern European countries have much more work to do in
fighting corruption that became part of their political cultures due to their Soviet past. 86 After
the USSR collapsed, corruption in the Eastern Europe region inherited the following features:
1) it was relatively inexpensive because bureaucrats have low salaries –corruption payments
might be estimated as token payment in other countries; 2) bureaucrats found new lucrative
monetary opportunities that their posts provided them with in the new capitalistic world; 3)
numerous new anti-corruption laws were enacted, but were reluctantly followed; and, 4)
businessmen relied on bribes while doing business. 87
Corruption is still a problem that affects both public and private sectors of the countries in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, despite numerous reforms. 88 OECD launched a peer review
program in the frame of Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
(ACN) to trace the efficiency of fighting corruption in the region. The Istanbul AntiCorruption Action Plan (IAP) was launched in 2003 as a sub-section of this peer review
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action 89 that includes Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Mongolia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 90 (Russia is in another anti-corruption network). 91
During the fourth review round in 2016-2019 under the peer review program, OECD
claimed that the corruption level was still high in the region and had not changed visibly
since last review 92 (2013-2015). 93 According to Transparency International, 56% of the
respondents in Ukraine and 39% in Russia indicated that corruption/bribery was one of the
three main problems that the governments should deal with. 94 Interestingly, respondents were
not also satisfied with governments’ actions to address corruption: 86% of respondents in
Ukraine and 62% in Russia thought that the government poorly addressed corruption. 95 Also,
the average score of Corruption Perception Index in the region in 2018 was 35 (out of 100
where 0 very clean and 100 is highly corrupt). “Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the
second lowest scoring region in the index, ahead of Sub-Saharan Africa which has an average
score of 32.” 96
Nevertheless, the parties of ACN and IAP are taking steps to address corruption by
implementing international treaties and taking part in periodic peer reviews. For example, all
the member countries of ACN and IAP implemented “the UN Convention against Corruption
and participate in its Implementation Review Mechanism.” 97
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2. Corruption Situation in Russia
Historically, in the Russian social conscience, private and public interests are
intermingled, which defines people’s tolerance to corruption. 98 Russian legal tradition to
tolerate corruption can be characterized by legal nihilism (people did not believe in law
because it was a means of suppression); laws were not deeply accepted by people as
authorities applied them in arbitrary ways; and contempt of laws was expressed by
academics) and ethical dualism (for peasants, it was unacceptable to deceive a neighbor, but
it was a different matter to deceive a landlord or governmental official). 99
By the time of the USSR collapse in 1991, Russia already had a history of deep-rooted
corruption. 100 After 1991, when old rules and institutions were knocked down and a new
system was not yet created, the society was ruled through “informal practices” of ex-Soviet
politicians and officials. This was the period when the political elite (that eventually became
“oligarchs”) obtained public property through illegal privatizations (the same situation with
chaotic privatization was also in Ukraine). That allowed a newly-appeared elite to
concentrate money and power and create a kleptocratic regime. 101 In addition to this, the
work of law enforcement bodies such as police, prosecutors, and courts was not satisfactory
due to lack of financing, training, and experience. 102
Since the beginning of Mr. Putin’s presidency in 2000, the corruption situation has not
significantly changed, although several strategies aimed to reduce the level of corruption
were formally applied. 103 But something has definitely changed: the so-called “oligarchs”
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turned out to be “cronies,” who only have their power because of their ties to the president. 104
These cronies fulfill different tasks, both internally and externally, from “financing elections
and supporting local political figures, using money coming from the state budget via
procurement orders, to buying international support and strategic investments abroad.” 105 The
entire inner policy structure is affected by the interests of different groups of oligarchs that
can influence the state authority at all levels. 106
The president in Russia has enormous power to appoint ministers in the government,
judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Court, federal judges, and senior criminal justice
officials; the majority in the Parliament is under the president’s control. It means that the topdown system of vertical power and the entire corruption mechanism is under Putin’s control.
In this regard, Russia can be characterized as an authoritarian country with state-corporatist
capitalism, aimed to protect and promote the interests of those close to the President and
other officials who show loyalty to the President’s regime. 107
In Teva, the corrupt activity fell within the logic of described system and was possible
due to the involvement of a high-ranking official: the Council of the Russian Federation Boris
Shpigel, who had connections in the Ministry of Health in Russia and was a shareholder of
the company that supplied medicine to the government. After Teva broke its ties with Boris
Shpigel, the company lost its access to governmental procurement in Russia. 108 So, if one
does not have connections to the “right” people, opportunities for a big business become very
limited.
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In general, the situation with corruption in Russia looks even worse than in Ukraine.
According to Transparency International, Russia was ranked 136 out of 180 countries in
2021; 109 also, from 2016 until 2021 the country stayed on the same score level: 29 points. 110
The country’s formal signing of such treaties as “Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
and its monitoring body, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) which are both
part of the Council of Europe, along with commitments from the 2016 Anti-Corruption
Summit … the Civil Law Convention on Corruption which allows citizens and private sector
actors to seek redress for corruption cases” 111 does not seem to work in practice and show
results. 112
3. Corruption Situation in Ukraine
Since Ukraine declared its independence in 1991 until today the country remains affected
by corruption. The political system in Ukraine can be described in two words: state
capture. 113 High-ranking officials’ offices depend on “masters”, who need to be paid “rents”;
almost all spheres of life of the society (for example, visit to doctor, business transactions,
and political campaigns) have been penetrated by corruption. Society considers everyday
bribery as a means for the needed things to be done, which results in a high tolerance of
corruption. 114
Corruption has caused numerous hindrances for foreign companies. Among them are
delays of VAT refunds that ranged from several month to more than a year - sometimes tax
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authorities found pretexts not to refund at all. 115 In 2017 ex-President Petro Poroshenko
admitted in an interview that the system of VAT refund was opaque and allowed to
“postpone without explanations, abolish or exclude from the [VAT] register.” 116
In such an environment, doing business in Ukraine without paying bribes looked
fantastical rather than realistic. ACTI Ukraine’s involvement with illicit payments was not
surprising, considering that the company aimed to receive legitimate tax refunds, but did not
have mechanisms to influence the tax authority and change the system in a legal way.
After revolution in 2014, the “system was shaken but not broken.” 117 Although there were
created specific bodies in the EU that supported Ukraine (the Support Group for Ukraine and
the EU Advisory Mission) and “provided expert assistance in drafting the laws, setting-up the
new anti-corruption institutions, or defining conditions applying to the EU’s financial
assistance,” 118 a lot of predecessors from the previous regime stayed in positions of power,
and continued to abuse their official positions.
Nevertheless, the revolution in 2014 triggered some changes in the society: 1) there were
settled e-declarations 119 for officials who performed the functions of state or local
governments; 120 2) there were changes to the members of the High Council of Justice, the
body that appoints justices, and the Supreme Court was restructured and new judges were
selected; 3) the prosecutors’ system was reorganized; 4) new bodies charged with fighting
corruption were created: the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, the National
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Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (which has investigative and certain law-enforcement
powers), the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (which monitors senior official
declarations and other data), the National Asset Recovery and Management Agency, 121 and
the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine. 122
It is notable that Ukrainian officials obstructed implementation of the newly built anticorruption system in Ukraine. Among the obstructions were: ‘technical problems’ with the edeclaration system; political conflict in appointing the head of the National Agency for
Prevention of Corruption; conflicts between the newly-created National Anti-Corruption
Bureau of Ukraine and the General Prosecutor’s Office; 123 the inability to find high-level,
well-paid professionals; and, insufficient funding of the new bodies (for example, only under
the pressure of the Western partners did the annual budget of the National Anti-Corruption
Bureau of Ukraine increase from $4 million to $31 million). 124
According to Corruption Perception Index, Ukraine gained only 6 points for the period
2014-2021 and scored from 26 to 32 (where 0 is the most corrupt and 100 the least). 125 This
shows a still high level of corruption in the country (in 2021, Ukraine ranked 122 out of 180
countries according to Transparency International ranking) 126. To compare, in 2021, Belarus
was ranked 41, Poland – 56, Slovakia – 52, Moldova - 36, Hungary – 43, Romania – 45. 127
Although anti-corruption reform was announced and new governmental bodies were
established in 2014, this did not bring noticeable results and criminal investigations.
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However, with the pressure of civil society and the international community growing, we
might see positive changes in the years to come. 128
For businesses, situation in Ukraine is still tough. Manager of Danone Ukraine, a
subsidiary of the French food group, stated that although during the Yanukovych presidency
they luckily were not targeted by illegal tax collection, after the Revolution in 2014 they were
faced with “a completely unprofessional mafia [tax authority] who are there simply to extort
as much as they can while in office.” 129 Also, a big agricultural company reported to Reuters
that the company had lost a case in the court because they did not pay a judge bribe in the
amount of $30,000. 130
As we see, the system in Ukraine was (and still is) ripe for corruption. Weak compliance
and management made it possible for Teva to be engaged into bribery; the company used a
lucrative opportunity to obtain a license to sell pills and gain a part of the Ukrainian
pharmaceutical market by means of illegal payments. The corrupt state system that was (and
still is) predisposed to corruption gave a relatively cheap (in comparison with gained profits)
opportunity to circumvent the law.
4. The FCPA Enforcement Tendencies
The FCPA enforcement against companies 131 in 1977-2017 had the following tendencies:
1) until 2005, there was virtually no enforcement against non-US companies; 2) enforcement
actions were concentrated mostly on the countries that were participants of the OECD AntiBribery Convention and paid bribes to officials from highly corrupt countries according to
Transparency International; and, 3) most of the non-US companies investigations had “a US
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cross-listing, significant US operations, and/or high internal control risk.” 132 The Teva and
ACTI Ukraine cases fall under these tendencies as violations occurred in the countries with
high level of corruption and had a US cross-listing (Teva) and high internal control risk
(although the parent company ADM was an American company that was investigated as
well).
Also, it was found that the quantity of the FCPA investigations depends on a country’s
economic activity rather than on its corruption level. 133 The FCPA enforcement is not very
active in the territories of Ukraine and Russia. Such countries as China, Brazil, India, and
Indonesia have much higher FCPA investigation statistics than Russia (and, obviously,
Ukraine). To compare, there are 150 China-based companies that are traded on U.S.
securities exchanges and only 8 Russian (in Ukraine only two). 134 In the meantime, both
China and Russia have a high corruption rate according to Corruption Perception Index. 135
Publicly traded companies have usually more precise attention paid to their anti-bribery
and internal controls provisions by the SEC. Nevertheless, U.S. authorities can target U.S.
companies that have operations in Russia - but low economic activity results in low FCPA
enforcement in the area. Statistics prove that: in the last 5 years, around 40 percent of all
FCPA settlements involved violations that took place in China and only 7 percent in
Russia. 136
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After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the dynamic of FCPA enforcement in the Eastern
Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 137 may change. Operations with
Russian companies and oligarchs will be under close attention of the U.S. authorities. Also,
countries from that region might have close ties with the Kremlin, which potentially makes
them targets for FCPA enforcement. Moreover, in 2021, President Biden declared the
strengthening of anti-corruption efforts, including aggressive enforcement and expansion of
the FCPA around the world. 138 The pool of companies that worked in Russia, however,
shrank significantly after February 24, 2022. In combination with sanctions imposed, that
will reduce economic activity in the country even more. That means that businesses that
stayed or will appear in the future are likely to get underenforcement of the FCPA because
such companies could just be ‘unnoticeable’ for the foreign law-enforcement bodiese. 139
Considering the high level of corruption in Ukraine and Russia, entrepreneurs that are
doing business in these countries are under constant ‘pressure.’ The companies that have
connections with the US or European countries are under double pressure due to their anticorruption laws, which track companies’ corruption activities abroad and severely punish for
them (for example, the FCPA in the US, the Bribery Act in the UK, Sections 331 and 333 of
German Criminal Code, etc.).
On the one hand, it might look like local companies are restricted only by the local anticorruption legislation and are not affected by the fierce sanctions under foreign
extraterritorial legislation. Also, it seems that they might have more opportunities to bribe
officials and obtain advantages in the market over the US and European companies.
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On the other hand, statistics shows that, for example, from 2004 to 2018, the FCPA
monetary resolution against domestic (US) corporations amounted to $21,182,931 and
$75,016,934 against non-US companies. 140 These unequivocally demonstrate that foreign
companies fall under the FCPA enforcement even more often than domestic companies. In
the meantime, local companies that do not have connections with foreign countries might
have opportunities to bribe officials and rely on local weak systems; this risk cannot be
eliminated completely without robust anti-corruption enforcement within the country.
Considering changes that are going on in the world today, the FCPA enforcement trends
might change, and the FCPA enforcement may concentrate on Eastern European countries.
Nevertheless, the countries with high population still will attract the attention of US
governmental agencies due to their high economic activity and ties with the US economy and
business.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to claim that FCPA enforcement always changes societies. As it is clear
from the paper, there are multiple factors that should be considered when considering this
influence. Among these factors are: 1) the region where the country is situated, 2) local
culture and traditions, including business traditions, 3) how corruption penetrated social and
political life and the size of the economy, 4) the legal framework of the country, 5) political
will to ‘notice’ and combat bribery, 6) the reaction of society to corruption issues, and 7) the
quantity of the FCPA enforcement actions that were initiated in the region.
Taking into consideration the number of FCPA enforcement actions in Ukraine and
Russia, it is hard to affirm that they affected the attitude to corruption in societies. They
rather confirm the systemic problems in place. Meanwhile, we cannot deny the growing
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tendency of establishing compliance systems inside the organizations around the world and
increasing enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.
Regardless of high corruption levels in Ukraine and Russia, Teva and ADM changed their
business practices, built robust anticorruption systems, and continued doing business in the
countries. Since the DOJ and SEC supervised the companies’ inner changes after entering
into the NPA and DPA, and closed the cases after 3 years, it is possible to claim that it was
possible for the companies to operate in a corrupted environment without being engaged in
illegal activities. This fact shows that western companies are able to work in Ukraine and
Russia without being engaged in bribery.
In addition to the companies’ desire to cope with illegal practices, further positive
changes are possible in a long run with the support of numerous law enforcement actions,
work of non-governmental organizations, and help of developed countries.
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